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Appendix A 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
This appendix offers a simple model that  more formally characterizes the 
trade-offs facing members of Congress and the president on the issue of pat- 
ronage. In particular, the model illustrates why the growth of the federal labor 
force contributed to the adoption of  a merit system, why the president was 
likely to lead efforts to control the volume of patronage, and which members 
of Congress were most likely to support passage of the Pendleton Act. In gen- 
erating these results, it will be assumed that individual members of Congress 
and the president are all vote maximizers. 
Following Denzau and Munger (1986) and others, we divide the voting pop- 
ulation into two groups: informed and uninformed voters. The former group 
compares the receipt of government services with taxes levied and, hence, is 
concerned about the productivity of  the federal workforce. In  addition, in- 
formed voters monitor the voting record of elected officials and keep track of 
the positions taken by them on various issues. The closer this voting record is 
to the preferences of the informed voters, the more likely it is that this group 
of voters will vote in favor of the elected official. In contrast to informed voters, 
uninformed voters pay no attention to these issues and instead are influenced 
by  campaign advertising, electioneering, canvassing by  patronage workers, 
and, in some cases, the promise of a federal job. 
The foregoing discussion suggests a model of vote maximization of the form 
(All  V = nF(Q,  I> + (N -  n)H(aW 0. 
This equation is designed to capture the behavior of a given member of Con- 
gress; a similar model will be constructed for the president. In line with the 
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approach taken by Peltzman  (1976), we have two separate probability func- 
tions: F is the probability that a member of the informed group votes for the 
legislator, while H is the probability that a member of the uninformed group 
votes in favor. The number of informed voters in the legislator's district is de- 
noted by  n and the total number of  voters by N. The probability that an in- 
formed voter grants support is a positive function of the productivity, or perfor- 
mance, of the federal workforce, Q, and the voting record of the legislator, I. 
In the relevant range, it is assumed that both Q and I are subject to decreasing 
returns so that 
(Unless specified otherwise, subscripts refer to either partial or, where appro- 
priate, total derivatives.)  We also assume that, in the relevant range, Q and I 
are independent factors in the vote function so that the cross-effects are zero 
(i.e., F,,  = 0). While this assumption is not tenable when F approaches unity, 
most election  outcomes in the late  1800s were substantially  less than unity, 
around 0.7. The campaign services rendered by patronage workers are denoted 
by  W where (Y is a productivity coefficient. In addition, legislators can devote 
their own time and resources,  C, to campaign activities. Both  W and C are 
assumed to be subject to decreasing returns so that 
H,>O,  Hw<O,  H,>O,  H,,<O. 
Although not explicitly included in equation (Al),  it is assumed that vote max- 
imization is conditional on the probable reactions of an opponent. 
To include explicitly the trade-offs facing an individual member of Congress 
in bargaining for patronage, we set 
(A4) 
('45)  C=.i-e. 
Equation (A2) indicates that the productivity of  federal workers is a function 
of two variables, r and L. One of the main objectives of the Pendleton Act was 
the separation of the civil service into two components: classified (merit) and 
unclassified (patronage) employees. To account for this delineation,  r is de- 
fined as the ratio of merit system employees to total federal employment. As 
explained in the text, productivity differed between patronage and merit work- 
ers. Thus, holding the total number of federal workers, L, constant, an increase 
in r will increase Q (i.e., Q, >  0). In contrast, given the arguments presented in 
the text on control and increasing organizational size, an increase in L holding r 
constant should lower productivity (i.e., Q,  < 0). These conditions also sug- 
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gest that expanding the merit system will have a greater effect on productivity 
the larger is the federal labor force (i.e., Q, > 0). 
Because legislators engage in trades with the president for the rights to pat- 
ronage positions, equation (A3) provides a means for incorporating the costs 
of obtaining patronage positions into the model. Under the Constitution, it is 
the president who in general holds the initial rights to allocate patronage. As 
described in the text, the president would exchange these rights for support on 
various programs In essence, there is a market for patronage, wherein the presi- 
dent acts as the seller of patronage and members of Congress are the demand- 
ers. Within this framework, there is both a quantity and a unit price. Here, the 
going price for a patronage position, f: can be thought of in terms of roll-call 
votes promised the president. Although in actual practice this price will likely 
vary across bills, the purpose here is to incorporate into the model the notion 
that the president trades patronage for congressional support. Accordingly, we 
simplify the analysis and assume that there is a single price in terms of roll- 
call votes that each member of Congress pays in order to buy a patronage posi- 
tion. The price is a function of the total amount of patronage offered by the 
president, W,  and W is the quantity of patronage purchased by the member of 
Congress. Since the president  is using patronage to buy  favorable roll-call 
votes that he would not otherwise have, and since members of Congress are 
vote maximizers, these exchanges have their costs to legislators. To illustrate 
the cost to a legislator of buying patronage, we simplify and assume that each 
legislator can be thought of as having a preferred roll-call voting record, as- 
sumed to be single dimensional, that reflects his or her vote-maximizing posi- 
tion on the issues, absent any trades with the president. This point is denoted 
as X in equafion (A3). When buying patronage, the legislator moves away from 
that point, with the decline measured by the unit price of patronage times the 
quantity purchased. 
In the text, it was argued that patronage workers had to be monitored else 
local party officials would exercise control over their activities and the provi- 
sion of campaign services to the legislator would decline. To incorporate this 
aspect into the model, let rn denote monitoring activity by the legislator, and 
allow for increases in rn to increase the productivity of patronage workers (i,e., 
am  >  0).  Monitoring requires that the legislator devote effort, e, to that activity. 
How effective each unit of effort is in raising rn depends on the number of 
patronage workers the legislator has; the larger is  the less effective is each 
unit of e. These concepts are contained in the definition of a  in equation (A4). 
The opportunity cost for e is embodied within the model via equation (A5). 
Here, Z is the legislator's total stock of effort that can be devoted to nonpatron- 
age provided campaign activities, C. 
The objective function for the president is very similar to that of a member 
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Here, the  A  identifies the particular function or variable as referring to the 
president. With the following exceptions, these variables and functions have 
the same general purpose and form as those in equation (Al): 
('47)  i = 2 + P(WW, 
dP(Ww  = MR(W = P(W(1 + UEJ, 
dW 
('49)  W  = (1 -  r)L -  W. 
In equation (A7), the term P(wW  is the total number of  roll-call votes ob- 
tained by  the president in exchange for patronage positions. By exchanging 
patronage for roll-call votes, the president attains a more preferred policy posi- 
tion, which in turn will increase the support received from informed voters. 
Since we assume price-taking behavior for each member of Congress, P(l%')  is 
the aggregate inverse demand function for patronage. Thus, P(WW is analo- 
gous to total revenue in standard market analysis, and, as shown in equation 
(A8), the derivative of P(WW  with respect to Il'  yields the marginal revenue 
function, MR. In turn, MR is a function of the elasticity of demand for patron- 
age, E,.  Given a negatively sloped demand curve for patronage, the price elas- 
ticity will be negative. 
A key variable in the president's objective function is W.  As shown in equa- 
tion (A9), the number of patronage positions that the president chooses to ex- 
change for roll-call votes is equal to the total number of unclassified positions 
available, (1 -  r)L, less W.  The latter variable measures the number of patron- 
age positions that the president keeps for his own dispensation. These patron- 
age workers are selected by the president and, as shown in the second term in 
equation (A6), provide campaign and constituency services that generate direct 
support for the president. In actual practice, the president can also benefit from 
having political appointees in the various agencies to monitor and effectuate 
policy, implying that i  could be a positive function of  W.  The analysis offered 
here, however, is meant to apply to rank-and-file federal employees, not to 
high-ranking political appointees, whose selection was and remains largely 
unaffected by civil service reform. As with members of Congress, the produc- 
tivity of the president's own patronage workers is a function of his monitoring 
activity, with riz equal to 2/W. 
Consider first the optimization problem faced by the president. Prior to pas- 
sage of the Pendleton Act, r was equal to zero, leaving the president with the 
choice variables 2 and W.  Optimizing with respect to these two variables yields 
the following first-order conditions: 
V, = Hflol, -  He = 0, 
(All)  Vw = ki(-~~)  + &,(G  -  riz~~)  = 0. 
To reduce the amount of  notation, voter population numbers are not shown. 
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the marginal returns to effort in the two types of campaign activities are equal. 
Now consider the implications embodied in equation (All). The sign of the 
first term in equation  (All) depends on whether marginal revenue,  MR, is 
positive or negative. If the president could effectively monitor and utilize an 
unlimited number of patronage workers, W, the quantity of patronage workers 
exchanged for roll-call votes,  W,  would always be located within the elastic 
proportion of the demand function. But there are limitations on the president's 
ability to utilize a large number of patronage workers effectively. Indeed,. the 
description offered in the text suggests a president who was overwhelmed with 
the problem of managing patronage. Within the context of the model, notice 
that the term (8 -  h8,J in equation (All)  could be negative, with the likeli- 
hood of that outcome increasing with increases in  W. Basically, if  % is too 
large, there is a loss of control, implying that the per unit decline in productiv- 
ity dominates the benefits of increasing W. While the president would prefer 
to avoid such an outcome, prior to the Pendleton Act the only alternative was 
an increase in W,  and that would lead to a decrease in the price of patronage. 
Thus, the optimal choice of  W could be such that the demand for patronage, 
W,  is inelastic in the relevant range. Under these conditions, the net benefits 
derived by the president from patronage will deteriorate if  the federal labor 
force continues to expand. 
Before showing why the net benefits from patronage will eventually decline 
with the growth of the labor force, it is important to emphasize that we are 
treating L as an exogenous variable. In actual practice, the size of the federal 
labor force is collectively determined by the president and the Congress. More- 
over, elected officials can be expected to have their own preferred level of L 
that maximizts the number of votes they receive. Increases in demand for gov- 
ernment services will likely increase the demand for L, and, when viewed in 
the aggregate, voter support can increase with the expansion of the labor force. 
However, the major emphasis of the analysis offered here is on changes in 
voter support due to changes in the size of the patronage pool, not on the aggre- 
gate effect of expanding the size of government. 
To  show why voter support for the president will eventually decline as the 
patronage pool expands, evaluate the president's  objective function, 6,  at its 
optimal values, 2"  and W*, and differentiate with respect to L: 
With increases in L, productivity declines, implying that the first term in equa- 
tion (A12) is negative. The sign of the second term depends on whether MR is 
positive or negative. If  there are limitations on the ability of the president to 
utilize patronage  workers  effectively, then  W  must eventually increase as L 
increases. Since equation (A4) also suggests that there is a maximum number 
of patronage workers that a member of Congress can effectively handle, there 
will be a quantity beyond which no additional patronage will be demanded. 
Given this cutoff point, MR must eventually turn negative. But, if  MR turns 
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in productivity, a lower Q, but actually desire a smaller patronage pool since 
that would  raise price  and  increase the returns from exchanging  patronage. 
Thus, sufficiently high levels of L will induce the president to promote civil 
service reform aimed at reducing the number of patronage positions. 
The provisions of the Pendleton Act essentially called for a small increase 
in  I:  If MR were negative, the president would gain from implementation of 
the act. To show this, evaluate the president’s objective function at its optimal 
values, and differentiate with respect to r: 
When MR is negative, both terms in equation (A13) are positive, indicating 
that the president would gain if the total number of patronage positions were 
reduced. 
Now consider the optimization problem for a member of Congress. Collec- 
tively, the members of Congress could, with sufficient support, change  r;  as 
they did with the passage of the Pendleton Act. Individually, however, they take 
r as given and maximize with respect to e and W The first-order conditions are 
(A 14)  = HsM  -  H, = 0, 
(A151  V, = -F,P  + H,(a  -  ma,)  = 0. 
The above conditions are similar to those for the president except that a mem- 
ber of Congress would not obtain more patronage than he or she could effec- 
tively manage. That is, the term (a  -  marn)  in equation (A 15) would not be 
negative. We have asserted throughout that the demand curve for patronage is 
negatively sloped. Since the problem is not identical to a standard factor de- 
mand analysis, it is noteworthy  that the structure of  the model does yield a 
negatively  sloped demand curve for patronage. From the envelope theorem 
(see Silberberg 1990), we know that the following condition must hold: 
Here, aW*IdP is the slope of the demand curve. From the first-order conditions 
we obtain 
(‘417) 
implying that the demand curve for patronage is negatively sloped. 
As we argue in the text, not only did the growth of the federal labor force 
have an important effect on the president’s willingness to support civil service 
reform, but it also influenced members of Congress. However, because an in- 
crease in L will lower the price of patronage, the incentive to support reform 
as the labor force expanded was not as strong for members of Congress as it 
was for the president. To show why, consider the situation prior to the Pendle- 
ton Act, where r is equal to zero. Setting e and W at their optimal values, e* 
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and W*,  the legislator’s objective function, +, can be differentiated with respect 
to L to yield 
Because of the negative effect that growth has on productivity, the first term is 
negative. The second term in equation (A18), however, is positive for the fol- 
lowing reasons. First, note that, since the demand curve is negatively sloped, 
P-,  is negative. Now consider (aW/aL - l), and recall that equation (A9) re- 
flects both the direct and the indirect effects of a change in L on the quantity 
of  patronage  offered  to the  Congress. The indirect effect  accounts  for the 
change in the president’s own use of patronage,  W, as L increases (we are as- 
suming that each member of Congress correctly anticipates how the president 
will react to a change in L).  Again using the envelope theorem, we know that 
the following condition must hold: 
From the first-order condition, equation (A1 l), we obtain 
(A201  PwL  = Ff(-~~@)  + Ff~-~~*)  > 0. 
Accordingly, as L expands, the president will increase the amount of patronage 
that he utilizes in his own campaign, and that action will temper the decline in 
P. But for the term (aW/aL -  1) in (A18) to be positive, a~*laL  would have 
to be greater,than unity. Since  cannot exceed L, it is not possible for this 
effect to be greater than unity except in some local area. Thus, in contrast to 
the results for the president, the price effect of an increase in L can continue to 
temper the negative effect that the growth of  the federal labor force has on 
productivity even as L gets very large. 
Consider now the likelihood that a particular member of Congress will vote 
for the Pendleton Act. If an increase in r increases support from the electorate, 
the legislator will vote in favor. Differentiating the legislator’s objective func- 
tion with respect to r yields 
Because increasing r will improve productivity, Q, > 0, the first term in the 
above equation is positive. The second term, however, is negative. Even though 
the sign of  aW*/ar is negative  (with the increase in r due to passage of  the 
Pendleton Act, the president will reduce l?),  the magnitude of the change can- 
not exceed L. Thus, equation (A21) captures the basic trade-off facing mem- 
bers of Congress when voting on the Pendleton Act. Establishing a merit sys- 
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decrease the size of the patronage pool, leading to an increase in the price of 
patronage. Of course, Congress was not monolithic, and the benefits of improv- 
ing productivity relative to the negative effects of a price increase for patronage 
will vary across members. For example, in districts where the productivity of 
the federal  labor force, Q is relatively  more important to voters, it is more 
likely that the first term in equation (A21) will dominate the second. The evi- 
dence presented in the text indicates that the share of federal output tended to 
be the highest in the areas where commercial activity was greatest. The quality 
of federal services, such as postal and customs, was particularly important to 
voters in those districts. Thus, the importance of Q in the informed-voters prob- 
ability function would likely  increase with increases in the share of  federal 
output in the congressional district. 
The above model was also employed in chapter 3 to show why, once having 
adopted a merit system, the proportion of merit system employees to total em- 
ployment would expand with increases in total federal employment, why the 
president would take the lead in expanding merit system coverage, and why 
there would be continuing conflict between the president  and the Congress 
over patronage issues. 
Appendix B 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
In the text, it is argued that, once having adopted a merit system, the proportion 
of merit system employees to total employment would expand with increases 
in total federal employment. In particular, it is argued that the president would 
be in the vanguard to expand coverage. To show why, recall that, in passing the 
Pendleton  Act, Congress gave the president the authority to expand coverage 
of the merit system. In effect, the president was given the power to control r; 
the ratio of merit system workers to total federal civilian employment. Using 
the same assumptions and notation as in appendix A, recall that the president's 
objective function is 
(B1)  O  = C nP(Q, ?)  + C  (N -  n)  H(&W, k). 
Given the power to control r;  the president maximizes support by choosing 2, 
fi,  and K The first-order conditions are 
(B2) 
A* 
V, = H&% -  H, = 0, 
(B3) 
034) 
O+  = Pf(-~~)  + Hd& -  h&~  = 0, 
Or  = kQ~r  + Ff(-~~~)  = 0. 
Equations (B2) and (B3) are the same as before. But now equation (B4) indi- 
cates that the ability to control Y gives the president the option of placing fed- 